Refined-fuel shortages and high financing costs are narrowing the room to absorb further shocks

Executive assessment — the immediate constraint is usable capacity, not headline supply

The week’s most important risk is not simply that oil is expensive. It is that the fuels, transport routes, infrastructure and financing needed to keep economic activity running are becoming constrained at the same time.

Middle East crude exports have partly recovered, but refined products remain severely restricted. Gulf diesel and gasoil exports averaged 390,000 barrels a day in August, just over one-quarter of their pre-war level, according to the International Energy Agency. Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have tightened the same market. The result is a product-specific shortage: crude may be available while the diesel required by trucks, farms, generators and industry is not available in the right place or at an acceptable price.

The transport buffer is also weaker than it appears. Saudi Arabia can move oil west to the Red Sea, but attacks around Bab el-Mandeb reduced August exports from Yanbu to about half their July level, according to the US Energy Information Administration. A bypass is not a reliable alternative when ships, crews, insurers and finance providers cannot use it normally.

Food and inflation risks are rising through these logistics and energy channels, but the evidence does not support a global food crisis. The FAO Food Price Index rose 1.5% in September and 5.8% over the year, while global cereal stocks remain equivalent to 31.7% of projected use. The immediate concern is therefore distribution: import-dependent households and countries can face higher landed costs even when global supply remains adequate.

Financing conditions are making adaptation harder. Euro-area energy inflation reached 18.8% in September while the European Central Bank’s deposit rate stood at 2.50%. In the United States, the two-year Treasury yield closed at 4.83% and the ten-year yield at 5.28% on 2 October even as payroll growth slowed to 29,000. Expensive capital can delay the grids, storage, fleets, data centres and industrial upgrades intended to reduce future exposure.

The combined conclusion is narrower than a recession call. The evidence shows several operating buffers being consumed or becoming more expensive. It does not yet show a general global contraction. That judgement should change only if fuel and freight constraints persist alongside weaker employment, wider credit spreads, lower activity and delayed investment.

Six evidence-backed conclusions

1. Refined products have become a tighter economic constraint than crude oil. Gulf diesel exports remain near one-quarter of pre-war volumes, while Russian refining disruption is affecting the same market.
2. Alternative routes provide physical capacity, not guaranteed delivery. Yanbu’s August export decline shows that a bypass can fail when its maritime exit is also exposed to attack and insurance restrictions.
3. Food pressure is rising, but global stocks still separate price stress from a global shortage. September commodity prices increased, yet the 31.7% cereal stocks-to-use ratio remains a material buffer.
4. Higher energy costs and long-term interest rates can delay the investment needed to reduce exposure. The risk is a timing problem: adaptation arrives after margins, demand or public budgets have already weakened.
5. AI infrastructure demand is observable, but the profitability of long-dated capacity commitments is not. Supplier revenues and orders are strong; comparable evidence on paid utilisation and customer economics remains limited.
6. In conflict and health emergencies, access capacity is more informative than headline event counts. Roads, airports, bridges, triage beds, contact tracing and staff payment determine whether a local shock becomes a persistent humanitarian and economic loss.

Several stories share an energy-and-finance chain, while the security and health emergencies remain separate

The United States and Israel began major strikes against Iran on 28 February 2026, followed by Iranian attacks in the Gulf. The conflict made the Strait of Hormuz dangerous and difficult to insure. Before the war, approximately 21 million barrels of oil and petroleum liquids moved through the route each day. The shock is the common starting point for this week’s diesel shortage, marine-insurance stress and part of Europe’s energy-price increase.

It is not the sole cause of every development in the report. Food prices also reflect Black Sea logistics and weather. US long yields reflect inflation, fiscal borrowing, growth expectations, monetary policy and risk compensation. AI investment is a separate capital cycle. The wars in Ukraine, Yemen, Afghanistan and Tigray are not one conflict, and Congo’s Ebola outbreak has a different cause again.

The report connects these developments only where a demonstrated mechanism exists. The main shared mechanism is capacity under stress: scarce refined fuel, insecure shipping, costly finance, damaged infrastructure or impaired public-health and humanitarian access.

Refined fuels and financing lead the global risk dashboard, while humanitarian severity remains concentrated locally

The ordering reflects global transmission and business relevance for a GCC-facing global audience. It is not a ranking of human suffering.

1. Refined-fuel scarcity can restrict activity before crude supply or electrification can compensate

What changed

Middle East crude flows recovered from their worst point, but diesel and other refined-product exports remained severely constrained. At the same time, Ukrainian attacks disrupted Russian refining. On 2 October, G7 leaders agreed to coordinate a 100-million-barrel release over four months, including a front-loaded diesel release. The IEA reported that approximately 325 million barrels of the 400 million barrels pledged in March had already been released.

Scale and exposure

First order — the shortage is concentrated in usable products

Gulf net exports of diesel and gasoil averaged 390,000 barrels a day in August, just over one-quarter of pre-war volumes. Refined-product and liquefied-petroleum-gas exports remained 3.7 million barrels a day below February levels. In early September, US diesel exceeded $200 a barrel, 94% above its pre-war level, and diesel–crude price differences exceeded $100 a barrel in the US Gulf Coast and northwest Europe.

These figures describe a product and location mismatch. A barrel of crude in storage does not automatically become diesel in the market that needs it. Refinery design, maintenance, feedstock quality, port access and transport capacity determine the usable supply.

Second order — emergency releases transfer the shock into inventories and public balance sheets

Governments are using strategic stocks, coordinating refinery maintenance and seeking higher output from other refiners. Firms are paying freight surcharges, changing delivery schedules, reducing journeys or absorbing lower margins. Some demand destruction is already part of the adjustment: the IEA forecasts global oil demand in 2026 to be 2.5 million barrels a day below its previous-year level.

The G7 release buys time; it is not new production. Its effectiveness depends on the share delivered as diesel, the location of the stocks and the speed at which they reach users. Repeated releases can also create a later replenishment requirement.

Third order — persistent shortages would accelerate substitution, but unevenly

If diesel remains scarce, electric delivery fleets, rail, batteries and local renewable power become more attractive where grids, vehicles and finance are available. Heavy transport, agriculture and backup generation have fewer immediate substitutes. The structural effect would therefore be uneven: capital-rich systems can reduce liquid-fuel exposure faster, while smaller firms and poorer importers bear higher adjustment costs.

Supporting evidence and precedent

The current evidence itself tests the mechanism: crude flows improved without equivalent recovery in refined products. The 2021 semiconductor shortage provides a broader bottleneck precedent. The US Department of Commerce found median buyer inventories fell from about 40 days in 2019 to fewer than five in 2021, allowing a low-cost component to halt much higher-value production. Diesel can create the same type of constraint when it is essential, hard to substitute and unavailable in the required location.

Evidence that would change the assessment

• Strengthens: The October IEA report again records comparable diesel crack spreads above $100 a barrel or further reductions in Gulf and Russian product exports.
• Weakens: Gulf and Russian refined-product flows recover while diesel prices and spreads normalise without another large stock release.
• Next check: October IEA market report and the G7 implementation report requested within 20 days of the 2 October decision.

2. A route is not a buffer unless ships, insurers and finance providers can use it

What changed

Saudi Arabia used its East–West Pipeline to move oil to Yanbu on the Red Sea, bypassing Hormuz. That physical alternative became less dependable as attacks around Bab el-Mandeb affected the route’s maritime exit. The EIA estimated that August exports from Yanbu were about half their July level. The International Maritime Organization had recorded 88 confirmed Gulf vessel incidents cumulatively by 30 September.

Scale and exposure

First order — dual-route insecurity reduces effective transport capacity

The immediate loss is not only damaged cargo. Owners may withhold vessels, crews may refuse voyages, insurers may narrow cover and banks may raise the cost of trade finance. Longer routes also keep ships occupied for more days, reducing the carrying capacity available to the wider market.

Second order — firms pay for reliability through rerouting, inventory and contract changes

Importers hold more stock, diversify origins and negotiate new delivery and force-majeure terms. Exporters may accept lower volumes or higher logistics costs even when spot commodity prices rise. Air freight cannot replace bulk energy or grain: August air-cargo demand rose 4.4% while capacity fell 0.1%, but the mode serves different products and economics.

Third order — persistent route risk would move supply-chain design from lowest cost to assured delivery

If both Hormuz and the Red Sea remain unreliable, firms may redesign suppliers, inventory policies, financing terms and port options around service continuity. This does not imply general deglobalisation. It implies a higher premium on redundancy that has secure capacity, permissions, insurance and working capital.

Supporting evidence and precedent

The Red Sea crisis of 2023–2024 showed that physical passage can remain legally open while commercial traffic avoids it. UNCTAD recorded Suez transits about 70% below their mid-December 2023 level by June 2024. The relevant precedent is not that the two crises are identical; it is that security confidence and insurance can delay route normalisation after the immediate incident.

Evidence that would change the assessment

• Strengthens: A second comparable month of Yanbu exports below 75% of July alongside persistent insurance restrictions.
• Weakens: Hormuz and Red Sea sailings recover together with normal cover, transit times and port throughput.
• Next check: EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook scheduled for 6 October, subject to publication of a comparable Yanbu estimate.

3. Food prices are rising through several channels, but aggregate stocks still prevent a global-shortage conclusion

What changed

The FAO Food Price Index reached 136.0 in September, up 1.5% from August and 5.8% from a year earlier. Cereals rose 5.1% during the month and sugar 6.1%. Black Sea logistics, higher transport and energy costs, dry weather and strengthening El Niño affected different commodities in different ways.

The index remained 15.1% below its March 2022 peak. FAO projects the 2026 cereal harvest to be its second largest and the global cereal stocks-to-use ratio at 31.7%.

Scale and exposure

First order — import quotations increased, but not for one reason

Wheat, sugar and vegetable-oil buyers faced higher international prices. The increase is not proof that the Gulf conflict caused the entire move. FAO linked the pressure to transport disruption and weather, with different regional causes across crops. The global index also measures internationally traded commodities, not supermarket prices.

Second order — policy and currency responses determine who bears the cost

Importers can draw stocks, switch origins or subsidise domestic prices. Weaker currencies can raise local bills even if dollar prices stabilise. Export restrictions can protect domestic consumers temporarily while reducing internationally available supply. Subsidies transfer part of the cost from households to public budgets.

Third order — repeated shocks can change planting, procurement and food-security spending

Persistence through the next planting cycle would encourage longer contracts, strategic storage, crop substitution, irrigation and more public food-security spending. It could also increase the use of export controls, making traded supply less dependable. This structural pathway remains conditional because global stocks are not yet scarce.

Supporting evidence and precedent

The 2007–2008 and 2022 food-price episodes show how export restrictions and precautionary buying can amplify a physical or logistics shock. The current distinction is important: no comparable broad restriction wave is established in the present evidence, and global cereal stocks remain stronger.

Evidence that would change the assessment

• Strengthens: The next FAO index remains above 136.0 while the cereal stocks-to-use ratio is revised below 31.7%, or several major exporters restrict supply.
• Weakens: Prices ease, stocks remain stable and shipping costs normalise without widespread controls.
• Next check: FAO release scheduled for 6 November.

4. Energy inflation and high long-term yields could delay the investment needed to reduce exposure

What changed

The European Union’s energy commissioner estimated that the bloc paid more than €100 billion in additional fossil-fuel import costs after the Middle East war began, without receiving more physical energy. The figure is an attributed estimate, not a final national-accounts measure.

Euro-area annual inflation reached 3.8% in September, up from 3.2% in August. Energy inflation was 18.8%, while inflation excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco was 2.5%, according to Eurostat. The ECB had raised its deposit rate by 25 basis points to 2.50% effective 16 September.

In the United States, September payroll growth slowed to 29,000 and unemployment was 4.2%. Yet the two-year Treasury yield closed at 4.83% and the ten-year at 5.28% on 2 October. Weak hiring alone did not produce sustained relief in long-term borrowing costs.

Scale and exposure

First order — energy and borrowing costs are elevated at the same time

European importers pay more for energy, while borrowers face higher hurdle rates. The inflation composition matters: September’s headline increase was energy-led, and the core measure remained lower. In the United States, a 5.28% ten-year government benchmark raises the base rate for mortgages and corporate finance even if markets expect fewer central-bank increases.

Second order — high financing costs can slow both demand and adaptation

Firms pass costs through, absorb lower margins or delay projects. Households reduce discretionary spending. Governments consider support while facing their own debt-service costs. The same rate environment makes grids, storage, electrification and efficiency projects more difficult to finance precisely when their strategic value rises.

Third order — the system can enter an adaptation delay rather than a simple inflation cycle

Persistent energy costs can strengthen the case for domestic power, efficiency and electrification. Persistent financing costs can delay those investments. If the second force dominates, exposure remains high for longer and the next energy shock arrives before substitution is complete.

This is not yet evidence of a global recession. A broader contraction call requires a combination of weaker employment, falling freight or industrial activity, wider corporate credit spreads and lower loan growth—not high prices alone.

Supporting evidence and precedent

Post-2022 Europe shows that sustained energy insecurity can change sourcing and investment. Russian gas fell sharply as a share of EU imports and demand adjusted. The lesson is that structural change is possible, but it requires infrastructure, finance and time. The current risk lies in the financing gap between the shock and the completed alternative.

Evidence that would change the assessment

• Strengthens: Core inflation rises alongside high energy prices, the ten-year Treasury yield remains above 5.28% and corporate credit spreads widen while employment weakens.
• Weakens: Energy prices, long yields and credit spreads decline without a sharper deterioration in jobs or investment.
• Next check: Final September euro-area inflation, next US labour report on 6 November, and a defined corporate-credit-spread baseline.

5. AI suppliers show real demand, but fixed capacity obligations have moved the risk to utilisation and cash flow

What changed

AI supply-chain data remained strong. South Korean semiconductor export value rose 262.8% year on year in September to $60.3 billion, with both export volumes and contract prices increasing. Micron reported record fiscal fourth-quarter results, a 90% gross margin in its core data-centre unit and guidance of approximately $61.5 billion in revenue for the following quarter. Air Liquide announced more than €170 million of investment to supply ultra-pure gases to a semiconductor manufacturer in Japan.

The customer side is less transparent. Reuters reported from Anthropic’s confidential IPO prospectus that the company expects at least $518 billion of infrastructure commitments over roughly a decade and that approximately 80% is non-cancellable or payable regardless of use. Because the filing is not public, the figures cannot yet be independently checked against the full contractual language.

Scale and exposure

First order — suppliers are receiving real orders and pricing power

Export and company data support a strong physical investment cycle. They do not prove that semiconductor shipment volume rose by the same proportion as export value, nor that every downstream AI customer is profitable. NVIDIA’s additional $150 billion share-repurchase authorisation demonstrates cash-generation capacity at one supplier; it does not measure enterprise AI adoption.

Second order — the bottleneck is moving from securing capacity to using it economically

Long contracts require demand, power, cooling, network connections and cash flow to arrive on schedule. If utilisation lags, customers may still owe fixed payments. Suppliers may continue to benefit initially even as financial risk builds elsewhere in the chain.

Third order — successful utilisation would anchor a new industrial system; weak utilisation would transmit stress through contracts and finance

Strong paid demand would support long-lived data-centre, power, chip and industrial-input investment. Weak utilisation could pressure model-company cash flow, cloud counterparties, project finance and later equipment orders. The third-order conclusion is therefore not that AI investment is a bubble or guaranteed productivity boom. It is that fixed obligations have increased the importance of transparent utilisation and customer economics.

Supporting evidence and precedent

The global semiconductor shortage showed how specialised inputs can constrain much larger systems. The current AI cycle adds the reverse risk: large amounts of capacity may be financed before end-user economics are fully observable. Supplier revenue is evidence of investment demand, not final proof of productive use.

Evidence that would change the assessment

• Strengthens: A public filing confirms the contract structure while reporting weak utilisation, lower pricing, reduced enterprise retention or cuts to commitments.
• Weakens: Comparable disclosures show high paid utilisation, improving unit economics, diverse end customers and cash flow sufficient to service commitments.
• Next check: Anthropic’s first public filing or another source providing comparable usage, pricing and contract data. No numerical threshold is set before that baseline exists.

6. Repeated attacks are turning infrastructure reliability into a continuing cost of the Ukraine war

What changed

Russia attacked Ukrainian power infrastructure on 30 September and Kyiv transport links from 2 to 4 October. Three of Kyiv’s six road bridges were fully or partly closed during the attacks. Moldova also reported Russian weapons entering and exploding in its territory.

The bridge count is not itself the economic effect. The important variables are closure duration, alternative capacity, repair time and repeat attack.

Scale and exposure

First order — closures and power damage interrupt movement and economic activity

Road closures created traffic disruption, while power attacks added repair requirements and outage risk. Casualties and asset damage are observed. A consistent series for customer-hours lost, freight delay or restoration time is not yet available in the material reviewed.

Second order — operators reroute and repair under the threat of repeat attack

Transport and energy operators shift traffic, use backup power and stock repair equipment. Each adaptation carries cost and can become less effective when the same alternatives are repeatedly targeted. Moldova incurs security and border-management costs even without entering the war.

Third order — distributed power, protected crossings and repair capacity become permanent requirements

Persistent attacks would embed redundancy and protection into Ukraine’s operating and reconstruction model. This raises capital needs but can also create a more distributed system. The assessment remains conditional on attack persistence and the ability of protection and repair to reduce outage duration.

Supporting evidence and precedent

The joint Ukraine, World Bank, European Commission and United Nations assessment recorded more than $195 billion in direct damage and almost $588 billion in ten-year recovery and reconstruction needs before these attacks. This establishes the cumulative burden but should not be read as the cost of the week’s bridge and power incidents.

Evidence that would change the assessment

• Strengthens: Longer verified restoration times, repeated strikes on repaired assets and measurable declines in freight, power delivery or industrial output.
• Weakens: Durable protection, rapid restoration and a sustained reduction in attacks on infrastructure.
• Next check: Dated operator and municipal restoration updates before setting a numerical outage trigger.

7. Civilian access—not a combined conflict narrative—is the common test across separate emergencies

The remaining emergencies do not form one causal chain. They are compared only because access capacity determines whether people receive food, medicine and protection.

Afghanistan, Yemen and Tigray remain separate conflicts

Pakistan struck inside Afghanistan on 1 October; the United Nations confirmed at least 10 civilian deaths. Yemen’s government reported 20 strikes on Houthi targets on 2 October; the number is a party claim. In Tigray, federal forces reportedly retook Mekelle airport and government-allied forces entered Mekelle after TPLF withdrawal. Commercial flights had been suspended, and resumption had not been confirmed by the evidence cutoff.

The first-order effect is casualty, movement restriction and uncertain airport or road access. The second-order response is rerouting, stockholding, suspended travel and higher aid-delivery cost. A common third-order claim has low confidence: repeated access failures can deepen reliance on emergency logistics, but evidence must be measured separately in each location.

The Tigray update weakens the prior assessment that airport control would remain with Tigrayan forces. It does not establish restored civilian access. Control and usability are different conditions.

Congo’s outbreak shows how a small facility loss can weaken a much larger response

An eight-bed Ebola transit centre in Kigonze was destroyed. WHO reported 7,890 confirmed cases and 3,799 deaths as of 23 September, with only 83.4% of identified contacts monitored in the previous 24 hours. Later reporting placed cumulative cases and deaths above 8,300 and 4,018, but the official WHO series remains the more reproducible quantitative baseline.

The first-order loss is eight triage beds, not the entire regional treatment network. The second-order risk is slower referral and contact tracing in an environment already affected by conflict, displacement, staff-payment problems and mistrust. The third-order pathway is persistent local transmission or cross-border spread if access failures repeatedly interrupt detection. WHO assesses regional risk as high and global risk as low.

Evidence and precedent show that access indicators should lead the assessment

In both humanitarian and public-health crises, nominal capacity is not enough. An airport, road, hospital bed or response team must be secure, staffed, funded and reachable. The useful indicators are operational: flights resumed, roads passable, aid delivered, contacts traced and health workers paid.

Evidence that would change the assessment

• Strengthens: Continued flight or road closure in Tigray; further civilian casualties and access restrictions in Afghanistan or Yemen; two Ebola reporting periods above 700 cases a week combined with contact follow-up below 80%.
• Weakens: Sustained route and flight reopening, verified aid delivery, restored triage capacity and broad case decline with higher contact coverage.
• Next check: WHO and Africa CDC outbreak updates, UN access reporting and confirmed commercial-flight status for Tigray.

The strongest compounding chain runs from refined fuels and shipping into food, inflation and delayed investment

How refined-fuel and route disruption can compound:

1. Refined-fuel shortages and disrupted shipping routes raise diesel, freight and insurance costs.
2. These higher costs increase the price of delivered goods and weaken operating margins.
3. Rising food and energy costs add price pressure, prompting stock releases and targeted support.
4. Persistent inflation pressure can keep borrowing costs higher for longer.
5. More expensive financing can delay investment in the infrastructure needed to reduce exposure.
6. Delayed adaptation leaves the system more vulnerable to the next supply shock.

The chain has not fully activated. Global cereal stocks remain a buffer, a broad food-export-control wave is not established, and current evidence does not show a general credit contraction.

Three operating pathways define the next phase without pretending to precise probabilities

No numerical probabilities are assigned because route-specific insurance, AI utilisation, credit spreads and several restoration measures lack comparable public baselines.

GCC exposure differs by route and fiscal structure, while the largest costs fall on users with the fewest substitutes

The GCC cannot be represented by one impact number

Saudi Arabia has a Red Sea pipeline and port option, but Yanbu’s August decline shows the alternative is exposed. The UAE and other exporters have different bypass capacities and security conditions. Qatar remains highly dependent on maritime gas exports. Higher oil prices do not guarantee higher fiscal receipts when deliverable volumes fall.

Food exposure also differs by stocks, logistics, fiscal support and domestic distribution. The common regional issue is that energy export capacity, imported food and shipping reliability can be affected at the same time.

Relative beneficiaries and primary losers

• Relative beneficiaries: Non-Gulf refiners, US distillate exporters, memory and semiconductor suppliers, and providers of grids, storage and industrial gases can benefit where they have spare capacity and projects reach financial close.
• Primary losers: Fuel-intensive importers, thin-margin logistics and agricultural firms, low-income food-importing households, leveraged borrowers and populations dependent on disrupted aid or health systems face the largest near-term burden.

These are relative positions, not proof of a net economic gain. A supplier can benefit while the wider system loses output or purchasing power.

A broader contraction requires several indicators to move together

A recession or systemic-stress call should require falling freight or industrial volumes, rising retail food and energy prices, weakening employment, wider corporate credit spreads and lower loan growth in a defined economy. High commodity prices or bond yields alone are not sufficient.

The monitoring dashboard focuses on dated operating evidence

These triggers are editorial review points. They are not official forecasts, scientific tipping points or investment instructions.

Some conditions eased, but the prior week’s core call remains intact

The G7 stock release is a material near-term buffer. It does not restore production. Reported Congo Ebola cases slowed from their earlier peak, but geographic expansion and incomplete contact monitoring prevent a containment conclusion. Federal control of Mekelle may improve access, but control is not evidence that commercial flights or humanitarian movement have resumed. Weak US hiring reduced expectations of near-term policy tightening, yet the ten-year yield recovered during the trading day.

This is a qualitative forecast record. The previous report did not publish probability-weighted predictions that can be scored statistically.

Conclusion — the decisive question is whether critical capacity remains usable long enough for adaptation to arrive

This week does not show one global crisis. It shows several systems in which headline capacity overstates the usable buffer.

Crude supply is not the same as diesel supply. A pipeline is not the same as an insured delivery route. Global cereal stocks are not the same as affordable food for an import-dependent household. A high-value AI order is not the same as profitable utilisation. A bridge, airport or treatment bed is not a buffer unless it is secure, staffed and accessible. Investment intentions do not become resilience until projects are financed and operating.

The next assessment should therefore turn on operating evidence: refined-product flows, insured sailings, food stocks and policy, credit spreads, employment, AI utilisation, infrastructure restoration and civilian access. The outlook improves when those measures recover together. It worsens when shortages and financing costs persist long enough to delay the adaptation intended to solve them.

Method and evidence discipline

• Observed: Direct measurement, official record or verified operating condition.
• Estimated: Modelled result, attributed figure or calculation with a stated denominator.
• Inferred: Causal interpretation supported by evidence but not directly measured.
• Scenario: Conditional pathway activated only if specified triggers occur.

The report separates event date from evidence date, exposure from realised impact, production capacity from usable delivery and announcements from implementation. Historical events test mechanisms; they do not imply that the current event will produce the same magnitude or outcome.

Plain-language terms

• Barrels per day: A flow of supply or demand, not an inventory.
• Crack spread: The difference between the price of a refined fuel and its crude-oil input; a rough indicator of refining margin and product tightness.
• Landed cost: Commodity price plus freight, insurance and arrival charges.
• Core inflation: Inflation excluding specified volatile categories; this report uses the Eurostat measure excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco.
• Credit spread: The additional yield a corporate borrower pays above a government benchmark.
• War-risk premium: Additional insurance cost for a voyage exposed to conflict.
• Stocks-to-use ratio: Available stocks relative to projected annual consumption.